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Abstract Using Danish data, we ﬁnd that about three-fourths of the taxes levied to
ﬁnance public transfers actually ﬁnance beneﬁts that redistribute income over the
life cycle of individual taxpayers rather than redistribute resources across people.
This ﬁnding and similar results for other countries provide a rationale for ﬁnancing
part of social insurance via mandatory individual savings accounts. We discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of mandatory individual savings accounts for social
insurance and survey some recent alternative proposals for such accounts.
Keywords Social insurance · Individual accounts · Lifetime income distribution
JEL Classiﬁcation H53 · H55
1 Introduction
Redistribution from rich to poor and social insurance against income losses are basic
functions of the welfare state. Yet public policy discussions rarely acknowledge that
in modern welfare states, a large part of the taxes levied to ﬁnance social transfers
merely redistributes resources from one stage in the taxpayer’s life cycle to another.
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In other words, a considerable part of the tax bill does not redistribute resources from
the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor but is essentially income that the taxpayer trans-
fers to himself over his own life course. However, since there is rarely an actuarial
linkbetween(social security)taxespaidandsocialtransfers received,taxesandtrans-
fers inevitably distort labor supply. Moreover, transfer programs often create moral
hazard, as taxpayers have no incentive to reduce their reliance on transfers.
In this paper, we argue that mandatory individual savings accounts can play a
useful role in ﬁnancing social beneﬁts that exert only little redistributive power from
a life-cycle perspective and that give rise to serious moral hazard. For such beneﬁts,
savings accounts can enhance labor-market incentives at a relatively low cost in terms
of a more unequal distribution of lifetime incomes. Indeed, when individual accounts
are combined with a borrowing facility to alleviate liquidity constraints, and when
theyarealsocomplementedbyaminimumpublicpensionthatguaranteesaminimum
lifetime income for everyone, such an account system has the potential to enhance
incentives without substantially increasing inequality in lifetime incomes.
The main purpose of the paper is to provide a non-technical discussion of the case
for individual accounts (‘welfare accounts’) and to review alternative proposals for
the design of an account system. To limit the scope of the paper, we focus on the
ﬁnancing of social transfers to people of working age and do not consider proposals
for reform of the system of old-age social security (although we do explain how the
individual accounts for the working population could be integrated with the pension
system).
To motivate the relevance of individual accounts, we start in Sect. 2 by document-
ing the rather low degree to which current social-insurance programs redistribute
lifetime incomes. Using Danish data, we ﬁnd that about three-fourths of the taxes
levied to fund public transfers merely ﬁnance beneﬁts that redistribute income over
the same taxpayer’s life cycle rather than between different people. Section 3 then
discusses the theoretical rationale for social insurance based on individual savings
accounts, while Sect. 4 reviews alternative proposals for the design of welfare ac-
counts for the working population. Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions.
2 Empirical motivation: intrapersonal versus interpersonal redistribution in
the modern welfare state
In recent years, several empirical studies have investigated the extent to which social
insurance beneﬁts redistribute resources over the taxpayer’s own life cycle rather than
redistributing lifetime income from rich to poor. This section presents a new case
study of redistribution in the Danish welfare state and offers a brief overview of
similar studies for other countries.
The starting point for most of the studies is an estimate of the distribution of life-
time incomes. This is typically based on a micro panel data set covering a representa-
tive cross section of the population over some time period. Armed with such data, one
can link the annual incomes of individuals in different age groups (but with otherwise
similar characteristics) to obtain a series of annual incomes covering an entire life cy-
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X belonged to the age interval 46–50 years during that period, while individual Y
with similar socioeconomic characteristics lived through the age interval 50–54 years
in the data period. Furthermore, suppose that, in addition to belonging to the same
socioeconomic group, X and Y had roughly the same annual real income at the age
of 50. By matching these two individuals, including them in a single constructed life
cycle, one can obtain a series of annual incomes in the age interval 46–54 years in the
life cycle of a person with certain characteristics. By proceeding to match X and Y
with similar individuals belonging to younger and older age intervals during the data
period, one ends up with a series of annual incomes covering a full life cycle.
Once one has constructed measures of pre-tax and disposable lifetime incomes
for a representative sample of the population, one can compare the tax bill paid over
an individual’s life cycle to the social transfers received by that same taxpayer over
the life cycle. Most studies estimate the fraction of the aggregate direct and indirect
tax bill that serves to ﬁnance social insurance transfers. They then assume that a
similar fraction of each individual’s tax bill ﬁnances social transfers. By relating this
fraction of the lifetime tax bill to the total transfers received over the life cycle, one
obtains a measure of the degree to which the taxes paid over an individual’s life are
transferred back to that same person—either in the same year or in some other year
in the life cycle. This type of redistribution over the life cycle is usually referred to
as intrapersonal redistribution, whereas taxes that redistribute lifetime income across
individuals is termed interpersonal redistribution.
In Table 1 below, we present an estimate of the amount of interpersonal versus in-
trapersonal redistribution in the Danish welfare state, using the most recent estimates
of lifetime incomes in Denmark, presented in the spring 2005 report of the Danish
Economic Council (2005). These calculations account for all monetary public trans-
fers paid to Danish households, but they do not include the value of public services
delivered to households.1 Box 1 explains how we have separated interpersonal from
intrapersonal redistribution, adopting a methodology previously used by Hussénius
and Selén (1994), Falkingham and Harding (1996), O’Donoghue (2001), and Petters-
son and Pettersson (2003). Speciﬁcally, Box 1 explains how the numbers in rows 2
through 6 in Table 1 were calculated.
Box 1 (Measuring interpersonal and intrapersonal redistribution in Denmark)
The ﬁrst step in the estimation of the interpersonal and intrapersonal redistribu-
tion achieved through the tax-transfer system is to identify the fraction of taxes
serving to ﬁnance social-insurance transfers. The total social-insurance beneﬁts
received over the life cycles of the representative 10% sample of Danish house-
holds included in our data set amount to 43.7% of the total direct and indirect
taxes paid by these same individuals over their lifetimes, with the remaining frac-
tion of taxes ﬁnancing other categories of public spending. In our main scenario,
we therefore assume that 43.7% of direct and indirect taxes are ‘reserved’ for the
ﬁnancing of social-insurance beneﬁts. The direct taxes paid by each individual in
1Hansen (2005) explains in detail how the estimates of lifetime incomes for Denmark were produced.70 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
Box 1 (Continued)
each year of his life cycle are explicitly included in our data set, so we take
43.7% of these payments to represent the ﬁnancing of social insurance. Individ-
ual payments of indirect taxes are not explicitly included in our data, however, so
these payments have to be estimated. According to the Danish Ministry of Finance
(2002), the indirect taxes paid by the average Danish taxpayer amount to 22.3% of
disposable income, varying from 37.4% of annual disposable income in the bottom
incomedecileto 16.4% of annualdisposableincomein the top decile.We use these
estimates to impute indirect tax payments to all individuals in our sample, account-
ing for the income decile to which they belong in each year of their life cycle. The
fraction of income devoted to indirect taxes thus varies as individuals move from
one place in the annual income distribution to another over the life cycle. Having
allocated indirect taxes across individuals in this way, we assume that 43.7% of
these payments are ‘reserved’ for the ﬁnancing of social-insurance beneﬁt.
The next step is to separate the interpersonal redistribution achieved via the
social-insurance system (i.e. redistribution of lifetime incomes from rich to poor)
from the intrapersonal redistribution (i.e. redistribution over the individual’s life
cycle). We therefore deﬁne the net lifetime transfer received by individual i over





where Bit denotes transfers received by individual i in year t, and Tit is the part
of individual i’s direct and indirect tax payment in year t that is ‘reserved’ for the
ﬁnancing of social insurance. The total interpersonal redistribution achieved in a
life-cycle perspective (INTER) is found by aggregating the net lifetime transfers
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(Ni | Ni < 0). (2)
The intrapersonal redistribution can be split into two components. Within any
year in which an individual receives a transfer, he will also pay some amount of
tax (at least indirect tax), so that part of the transfer received is self-ﬁnanced. We
deﬁne the part of the transfer ﬁnanced by the taxpayer himself within the same
year as
SYit = min(Bit,Tit). (3)
Another part of the transfers received over the life cycle is ﬁnanced by the recip-
ient himself via the taxes paid in the other years of his life. This self-ﬁnancing of
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Box 1 (Continued)
The total intrapersonal redistribution (INTRA) is the sum of the self-ﬁnancing by










We have now decomposed total transfer payments into interpersonal and intraper-












All numbers in Table 1 are average payments accumulated over the life cycle,
accounting for observed differences in life expectanciesacross income deciles. To put
the numbers in the subsequent rows in perspective, the ﬁrst row shows the average
lifetime factor income (income before taxes and transfers) in the various deciles. The
second row from the bottom of Table 1 shows the average net transfer received by
those who end up with positive net receipts from the government over their life cycles
(those for whom Ni > 0). In the bottom row, we report the average net taxes paid by
those who end up paying more to the government than they receive (Ni ≤ 0). Not
surprisingly, most of the net recipients are concentrated in the lower lifetime income
groups,whilemost ofthenettaxpaymentsareconcentratedin thetopincomegroups.
This reveals that some amount of redistribution from rich to poor does after all take
place.
The ﬁrst ten columns in Table 1 contain average accumulated lifetime pay-
ments/receipts for each of the ten income deciles. The ﬁnal column reports averages
across the entire population. Adding the ﬁgures in the fourth and ﬁfth rows in the ﬁnal
column and dividing the sum by the ﬁgure in the second row of that same column, we
ﬁnd that 74% of the taxes levied to ﬁnance social insurance represent intrapersonal
redistribution over the taxpayer’s own life cycle, leaving only 26% of tax revenues
for interpersonal redistribution from high- to low lifetime incomes. Moreover, it is
striking that even at the bottom of the income distribution some people are net tax-
payers on a lifetime basis, while at the top of the distribution some people receive net
beneﬁts over their life course.
The studies by Hussénius and Selén (1994), Falkingham and Harding (1996),
O’Donoghue (2001), and Pettersson and Pettersson (2003) all use variants of the
method outlined above. Hussénius and Selén (1994) estimated that for the average
taxpayer in the early 1990s only about 24% of the taxes levied to ﬁnance social insur-
ance in Sweden accomplished interpersonal redistribution. Pettersson and Pettersson
(2003) recently updated and reﬁned the estimates by Hussénius and Selén, estimat-
ing lifetime incomes with the aid of a dynamic micro-simulation model and including
the value of important public services such as education, health care and care for the
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of income, Pettersson and Pettersson found that only 18% of the taxes levied to ﬁ-
nance social insurance transfers and social services in Sweden can be categorized as
interpersonal redistribution. Falkingham and Harding (1996) found a degree of inter-
personal redistribution between 48 and 62% in Australia and between 29 and 38% in
Great Britain, depending on the extent to which indirect taxes are assumed to con-
tribute to the ﬁnancing of social transfers. For Ireland and Italy, O’Donoghue (2001)
estimated a degree of interpersonal redistribution of 45 and 24%, respectively. The
strong message from all of these studies is that a large part of the taxes levied to
ﬁnance social insurance transfers in the modern welfare state merely achieves a re-
distribution of resources from one stage in the taxpayer’s life cycle to another rather
than a redistribution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor.
Several other studies have explored lifetime distribution and how it is affected
by public policy. Nelissen (1998) employs a micro-simulation model to investigate
how social insurance affects income distribution on a lifetime basis in the Nether-
lands. Similar studies for the United States include Coronado et al. (2000), Gustman
and Steinmeier (2000), and Liebman (2001). These studies ﬁnd that social insurance
does help to redistribute from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor. The contribution
of social insurance to the redistribution of lifetime incomes, however, is consider-
ably smaller than what is suggested by its contribution to the redistribution of annual
incomes. To illustrate, Nelissen (1998) ﬁnds that the Dutch social insurance system
reduces annual income inequality by 45% but lifetime inequality only by between 15
and 30% (depending on the discount rate and on the historical cohort considered).2
3 The theoretical rationale for social insurance based on individual savings
accounts
Asanalternativeorsupplementtotax-ﬁnancedtransfers,theconsumption-smoothing
function of the welfare state can be accomplished also through savings schemes that
link taxes and beneﬁts on an individual level. In such a scheme, workers contribute
part of their earnings to an individual savings account that is debited when the owner
draws social-insurance beneﬁts. At the time of retirement, any surplus on the account
is used to supplement retirement beneﬁts. By linking beneﬁts to contributions in an
actuarially fair way, the savings accounts reduce the tax wedge on labor income. So-
cial security contributions essentially become beneﬁt taxes.3 Moreover, moral hazard
in taking up beneﬁts is discouraged, as the beneﬁts are paid out of the accounts rather
than the common insurance pool. In this way, the accounts reap a double dividend:
a broader tax base on account of better labor-supply incentives produced by more
actuarially fair contributions and less beneﬁt take-up due to less moral hazard.
2Ter Rele (2005) covers a broader range of Dutch governmental programs, but does not account for all
heterogeneity and restricts himself to an analysis of the life cycles of six educational groups. He ﬁnds
that public programs substantially reduce inequality on a lifetime basis. Whereas lifetime tax liabilities are
proportional to lifetime incomes, lifetime beneﬁts of public spending do not vary with lifetime income.
3To the extent that existing social-security contributions ﬁnance wage-linked beneﬁts, they are in fact
already, at least in part, beneﬁt taxes.74 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
With well-functioning capital markets, rational forward-looking behavior and no
redistributional concerns, the government can rely on voluntary saving to accomplish
consumption smoothing over the life course. Compulsory savings accounts can help
address imperfect capital markets giving rise to liquidity constraints, just as they may
help to address policy concerns regarding lifetime redistribution, lack of self control,
and moral hazard in insurance. We explore these possible functions of compulsory
savings accounts in turn.
3.1 Liquidity insurance
Compulsoryindividualaccountsprotectpeoplebyallowingindividualstomakewith-
drawals from the accounts even if the account balance is negative. In this way, the
government in effect provides liquidity insurance and alleviates capital-market im-
perfections. The future compulsory contributions into the savings scheme act as col-
lateral so that the government can provide credit. The relief of liquidity constraints
is especially important for the lower middle class workers, who often face borrowing
constraints that prevent them from smoothing consumption over time in the face of
various shocks. These groups thus beneﬁt from more economic security. By allowing
workers to, in fact, access the capital market and thus decouple individualannual con-
sumption levels from individual annual incomes, compulsory savings accounts make
lifetime income rather than annual income a more important indicator of welfare.
In the context of a model with involuntary unemployment, Bovenberg and
Sørensen (2004) show that compulsory savings accounts can offer more efﬁcient
liquidity insurance than tax-ﬁnanced unemployment beneﬁts. Intuitively, by linking
contributions more closely to actual beneﬁts received, compulsory savings accounts
contain the adverse incentive effects of providing liquidity insurance. Moreover, in
contrast to a simple cut in unemployment beneﬁts, the introduction of mandatory
unemployment accounts and the associated liquidity insurance allows the individual
to bear the risk of unemployment in a period of life when consumption is higher.
Whereas a cut in unemployment beneﬁts would force a cut in consumption when it is
alreadylow(assumingthat theunemployedare liquidity-constrainedandthat beneﬁts
are lower than wages), achieving the same improvement of the public budget through
mandatory contributions to individual unemployment accounts would allow workers
to concentrate the cut in consumption in periods when they are employed and which
feature lower marginal utility of consumption.
3.2 Lifetime redistribution
In the presence of individual accounts, the government can protect the lifetime poor
by redistributing resources towards individuals who end up with a low or negative
account balance at the end of their working lives. In this way, the government redis-
tributes to the lifetime poor and provides insurance against catastrophic shocks that
substantially harm lifetime incomes. Redistribution is thus targeted more closely at
the lifetime poor, who are suffering a combination of low-wage incomes and frequent
adverse shocks during their lives. The individual savings accounts essentially help to
keep track of which individuals fare poorly in life. By thus in effect collecting infor-
mation on who is lifetime poor, the individual accounts improve the equity-efﬁciencyIndividual savings accounts for social insurance 75
trade-off if the government uses this information to redistribute towards those with
low lifetime incomes. The government thus focuses its scarce resources on redistrib-
ution from the lifetime rich to the lifetime poor—rather than making politically expe-
dient transfers among various important groups of voters with comparable long-run
livingstandards.Indeed,bycuttingoutthetransfersthatmerelyredistributeresources
over the life course and focusing the transfers on interpersonal redistribution to the
lifetime poor, the government can reduce distortionary tax wedges on labor supply.
The additional information on lifetime incomes essentially allows the government to
implement an optimal non-linear lifetime income tax.
In the context of a model with three types of households, Bovenberg and Sørensen
(2004) show how individual savings accounts can improve the equity-efﬁciency
trade-off by exploiting information on lifetime incomes to offer a lifetime income
guarantee. In particular, the government bails out individuals who end up with a
negative account balance. In this way, individual accounts establish an efﬁciency-
enhancing actuarial link between contributions and beneﬁts for high-income and
middle-income workers—who currently pay distortionary taxes partly to ﬁnance dis-
tortionary social beneﬁts to themselves—without reducing net transfers paid to the
low-income workers who remain protected by the lifetime income guarantee. In other
words, the savings accounts effectively enable the government to implement selec-
tive cuts in tax-ﬁnanced beneﬁts for high-income and middle-income groups with-
out having to reduce these beneﬁts at the bottom of the income ladder. At the same
time, by providing liquidity insurance (see Sect. 3.1), the government increases the
importance of lifetime income rather than annual income as an indicator of overall
welfare.
The individual accounts with a lifetime income guarantee as implemented by
Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) do not improve labor-market incentives for the life-
timepoor.Indeed,theindividualaccountsystemcanbeviewedasawaytoimplement
low marginal tax rates at the top of the lifetime income distribution. At the bottom
of the lifetime income distribution, however, high marginal tax rates remain the in-
escapable price of redistribution. The government can rely on ﬁnancial incentives to
stimulate the middle class, which accounts for a large share of effective labor input
in the economy. However, it must use other instruments to activate the lifetime poor,
whose employment is important for maintaining social cohesion in a society. Among
other things, the government can focus its active labor market policies and its admin-
istrative resources on this group. In particular, the government may collect additional
information by closely monitoring job search and health conditions. The government
provides beneﬁts on the condition that an able individual gives up leisure time to
improve skills or (look for) work. In this connection, workfare may play a useful
role; the mere threat of being put on workfare is likely to boost work incentives (see
Kreiner and Tranæs 2005).
Individual accounts are particularly attractive if the distribution of life-course in-
comes is not very skewed compared to the distribution of annual incomes. In that
case, annual income is typically not a good indicator for lifetime income; informa-
tion on lifetime income can thus make lifetime redistribution more efﬁcient. In the
modern life cycle with many working women and long periods of full-time or part-
time education, a substantial number of workers move between periods of full-time76 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
work to periods of voluntary (sometimes part-time) absence from the labor market
to educate themselves, start up a business, or care for children and/or frail relatives
(see e.g. Bovenberg 2005). This makes annual income a poor indicator of lifetime
income.
With little lifetime inequality, redistribution of lifetime incomes does not have to
be costly. Indeed, in that case, the government does not need to bail out many house-
holds with negative account balances. Intuitively, over their life cycles, a large middle
class is able to ﬁnance its own beneﬁts. This points to the importance of providing in-
dividuals with equal opportunities in the beginning of their working lives in the form
of good start qualiﬁcations provided by basic education. The less polarized a society
is in terms of human capital, the less the ﬁscal system has to redistribute resources
from high lifetime-income earners to low lifetime-income earners, and the more the
government can limit itself to helping individuals smooth their consumption over the
life cycle.
3.3 Mandatory saving and myopia
The individual accounts do not escape the trade-off between equity and efﬁciency to
the extent that lifetime incomes are distributed unequally. Liquidity insurance also
implies some costs. Lifetime redistribution as well as liquidity and lifetime income
insurance give rise to moral hazard; agents have an incentive to minimize their con-
tributions and maximize their withdrawals. The government must therefore regulate
withdrawals so that they can be made only for pre-speciﬁed purposes. Savings must
also be mandatory—at least until a speciﬁc upper limit is reached.
In addition to moral hazard, lack of self control and myopia are other reasons for
making saving mandatory. Compulsory savings accounts in effect extend mandatory
saving aimed at retirement to precautionary saving aimed at social insurance for in-
dividuals of working age. By being paternalistic, the government helps individuals
who lack self control to implement better consumption smoothing. However, if in-
dividuals lack the willpower or cognitive abilities to smooth consumption over their
lifetimes, annual disposable income becomes relatively more important than lifetime
income as a welfare indicator. Accordingly, the government should base its redistrib-
utive policies not only on lifetime incomes (and the associated balances in individual
accounts), but also on disposable incomes at each point in time. Intuitively, the gov-
ernment cannot rely on all individuals to allocate their lifetime incomes optimally
over their life course, and must therefore be concerned also about the distribution of
annual incomes.
A disadvantage of mandatory saving is that the government may force some peo-
ple to save too much. This can be an important drawback if preferences are hetero-
geneous and people cannot undo mandatory saving by borrowing. In that case, tax
incentives, which respect free choice, can complement limited mandatory saving as
an instrument to stimulate individuals to save. Tax incentives, however, typically im-
ply a large deadweight loss, as individuals who would have saved even in the absence
of tax incentives take advantage of the tax privileges by simply restructuring their
portfolio. To prevent this, the government can target tax subsidies at agents with low
ﬁnancial and human wealth by limiting tax incentives to low levels of saving.Individual savings accounts for social insurance 77
3.4 Moral hazard and optimal lifetime insurance
Another reason why savings schemes may enhance efﬁciency is moral hazard in in-
suring human-capital shocks over the life cycle. In particular, agents may be able
to affect the probability that the insured contingency occurs. To illustrate, unem-
ployment compensation can harm incentives to ﬁnd work and remain employable.
Another form of moral hazard is beneﬁt cheating, which can occur if the insured
conditions are difﬁcult to verify. Individuals may, for example, pretend to be sick or
disabled in order to claim sickness or disability beneﬁts. Moral hazard is a problem
even for actuarially neutral insurances that charge a premium that is directly related
to the expected individual beneﬁt from the insurance.4
Various developments increase the dangers of moral hazard and hence make
human-capital risks less insurable. As the economy shifts from blue-collar work in
industrial sectors to white-collar work in service sectors and knowledge-intensive
activities, mental causes of sickness and disability become more prominent. These
types of sickness and disability can be less easily veriﬁed than physical disabilities.
Moreover, an increasing number of workers now moves between periods of full-time
work to periods of voluntary absence from the labor market to enjoy leisure, edu-
cate themselves, set up a business, or care for children or frail relatives. In such a
transitional labor market, it becomes more difﬁcult to separate voluntary periods of
inactivity from involuntary unemployment.At the same time, individualscan increas-
ingly affect the probability that they become unemployed by investing in their own
employability. In other words, the dividing line blurs between the contingencies that
people are responsible for and those for which they are not. These changes in the
nature of social risks make it more costly to insure human capital in terms of harm-
ing the incentives to accumulate and maintain that capital. At the same time, a more
dynamic world economy and a decline of the extended family as an insurance device
have increased the demand for such insurance, as people experience more substantial
economic insecurity.
Moral hazard gives rise to a fundamental conﬂict between facilitating insurance
and providing incentives to reduce the probability that the insured risk occurs. In par-
ticular, reducing the extent of insurance through the introduction of deductibles can
combat moral hazard. Deductibles help internalize the social costs of beneﬁt pay-
ments, thereby discouraging individualsfrom making excessive claims on the welfare
state. At the same time, however, these deductibles impose costs on risk-averse in-
dividuals by reducing insurance through risk pooling. Another way to combat moral
hazard is to monitor agents and to regulate their behavior, but this may well be costly
in terms of intrusion in private lives.
Individual savings accounts can improve the trade-off between insurance and in-
centivesbyfacilitatingself-insurance overthelife course.Speciﬁcally,these accounts
increase the scope for deductibles without compromising minimum consumption
standards of individuals who are hit by temporary adverse shocks. They do so by
4Whereas the premia of such insurances do not distort the labor market, the beneﬁts harm labor-market
incentives if people can affect the probability that they are eligible for these beneﬁts by changing their
labor-market behavior.78 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
allowing individuals who suffer from liquidity constraints when they are hit by an
adverse shock to shift the payment of deductibles to the periods in which they can
more easily afford these costs. Individuals can thus self-insure over their life course,
and do not have to rely on insurances that gives rise to moral hazard. Risks can be
self-insured on a lifetime basis, and thus do not have be insured on a day-to-day basis.
Indeed, risks that may seem large on an annual basis may in fact be quite small when
considered over an entire lifetime. To illustrate, two unemployment spells of half a
year reduce lifetime incomes of an individual with a full-time working career of 30
years by only about 3%.
The accounts, in fact, combine a number of risks that occur during different pe-
riods of an individual’s life in a single insurance contract with a deductible that is
conditioned on the aggregate loss during the life course. Drawing on Arrow (1971),
Gollier and Schlesinger (1995) show that an umbrella insurance contract with a de-
ductible on the aggregate loss dominates separate insurance contracts with separate
deductibles for each type of loss if these individual losses are imperfectly correlated.
Intuitively, insurance protection is most valuable for the states in which several losses
occur simultaneously. An umbrella insurance policy that adjusts the deductible on
each separate loss to the outcome of the other risks in the form of a straight deductible
based on the aggregate loss provides the best protection against large aggregate losses
for a given insurance budget. Hence, an individual account that insures aggregate life-
time risk with a single deductible conditioned on aggregate lifetime losses dominates
separate insurance contracts with their own deductibles for risks faced in different
periods of an individual’s lifetime. For a given level of insurance cover, separate poli-
cies for risk experienced in each period underindemnify risk-averse individuals for
high levels of aggregate losses during the life course and overindemnify them for
losses that are experienced only in a single period. Compared to separate insurance
policies, the umbrella insurance contract provides better protection in the worst-case
scenario of a succession of adverse shocks during the life course in exchange for less
protection in other cases.
The potential of individual accounts in improving the trade-off between insurance
and incentives depends crucially on the extent to which individuals face correlated
shocks during their lifetimes. The potential welfare gains of individual savings ac-
counts are large if various income shocks are uncorrelated across time and among
each other. In that case, annual incomes are poor indicators of lifetime incomes, and
income shocks are, in fact, only small in the context of an entire lifetime. There is
thus ample scope for self-insurance by pooling risks facing a single individual. If
shocks are strongly and positively correlated, in contrast, risks do not become much
smaller in a lifetime context (compared to an annual context). In particular, some
individuals are always unlucky and therefore remain poor, while others seem to con-
tinuously “strike it rich.” Risks then remain catastrophic, even when viewed over the
entire life course. Self-insurance is then costly, and pooling risks across individuals
(rather than just intertemporally for each single individual) through insurance creates
substantial value. Also, the scarring effect of unemployment on human capital makes
insurance more valuable. More generally, labor-market risks tend to be correlated in
the presence of dual labor markets in which insiders enjoy high incomes throughout
their lives, while outsiders must make do with insecure jobs and tend to suffer fromIndividual savings accounts for social insurance 79
frequent and long-lasting unemployment. Hence, long unemployment durations in
slow-moving labor markets make individual accounts less attractive as an instrument
to provide lifetime income insurance.
For each type of human-capital risk, another combination between insurance
and self-insurance through saving is optimal, depending on the magnitude of the
risk in terms of the potential drop in lifetime income and the potential danger of
moral hazard because of endogeneity and non-veriﬁability of the insured risk. Self-
insurance should be relatively important for non-catastrophic risks that people can
affect through non-veriﬁable actions, such as short-term unemployment and the ﬁrst
sickness days. Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explore the optimal mix of self-insurance
through savings accounts and tax-ﬁnanced insurance. They show that self-insurance
should play a more prominent role if risk aversion is low, moral hazard is important,
various risks are uncorrelated across time and among each other, and these risks are
only small in a lifetime perspective. They also demonstrate that the optimal extent
of self-insurance depends on the history of an individual. Self-insurance should opti-
mally be the most important for those individuals who have not experienced adverse
shocks early in life so that they are not likely to end up being lifetime poor. Also
here, the conclusion is thus that saving schemes can play a more important role in
enhancing incentives for the middle- and higher incomes than for the lifetime poor.
The optimal mix between saving and insurance may also vary between workers in
different sectors in the economy. This provides an argument for a role for employers
and employees on a sectoral level in determining the optimal mixes between saving
and insurance. Indeed, individual savings schemes may be incorporated in collective
sectoral agreements. These agreements may provide for mandatory contributions into
both speciﬁc employee insurances with deductibles and individual savings schemes
from which individuals can draw to pay deductibles.
Bovenberg and Sørensen (2006) investigate the optimal structure of lifetime in-
come taxation and social insurance aimed at both lifetime income redistribution and
disability insurance, which can be interpreted as insurance against all kinds of idio-
syncratic shocks to human capital. They show that—even in the absence of moral
hazard—full insurance against these idiosyncratic shocks is not optimal. The rea-
son is that imperfect insurance encourages workers to self-insure by raising their
labor supply, thereby alleviating the distortionary impact of redistributive labor tax-
ation. Hence, a tension exists between lifetime redistribution and insurance against
human-capital shocks. By harming labor supply, social insurance imposes a negative
externality on the redistributive branch of the government. The greater the weight
attached to redistribution towards the lifetime poor with low skills, the less the gov-
ernment can allow the higher skilled to insure themselves fully against disability risk.
This result suggests that the government cannot leave individuals completely free
to use their social security contributions to buy actuarially fair insurances. Against
this risk of overinsurance, however, stands the risk of underinsurance due to selec-
tion giving rise to excessive transaction costs. In any case, a hybrid system of in-
surance and self-insurance would typically be optimal, depending on moral hazard,
selection, risk aversion and redistributive preferences and the associated distortionary
taxes.80 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
3.5 Welfare accounts for public services
In outlining the case for individual savings accounts, we have focused on insuring
shocks affecting the earning capabilities of individuals. Similar arguments for and
against savings schemes apply to the ﬁnancing of health care. In particular, savings
schemescanbepartofathree-pillarmodelinhealth-careﬁnancinginvolvingahybrid
system of saving, insurance and redistribution. This model involves, ﬁrst, government
assistance for those who cannot afford a minimum level of medical care (i.e. redistri-
bution); second, medical insurance for catastrophic events supplemented by limited
insurance for other events(i.e. insurance based on risk pooling); third, compulsoryin-
dividual medical saving for ﬁnancing deductibles and coinsurances (i.e. consumption
smoothing and self-insurance). The optimal mix between these three pillars depends
on the particular type of health-care cost considered. As explained above for social
insurance, saving schemes are most attractive for costs that are distributed rather uni-
formly across individuals (seen over the life cycle as a whole).
The principle of individual savings accounts can be applied to ﬁnance user fees
for not only medical care but also other services, such as higher education and child
care. If individuals pay these costs from their individual savings accounts and can
thus smooth these costs over their entire lifetime, the government can rely more on
consumer sovereignty for selecting the level, quality and nature of the service, and
thus does not have to impose strict regulations (e.g. by rationing individuals).
4 The design of individual accounts: alternative proposals
In the literature, several types of individual savings accounts have been proposed.
Fölster (1999) takes the currently paid taxes as the point of departure, reducing taxes
by an amount corresponding to the mandatory contributions to the individual ac-
counts (IAs) and premiums for lifetime income insurance. He proposes a narrow and
a broad implementation of the personal savings account. The narrow version incor-
porates beneﬁts for unemployment, sickness, child care, parental leave and housing
into the accounts. The minimum guaranteed pension is calibrated so as to ensure
that aggregate pensions paid out under the account system (including the positive IA
balances) equal the total amount of pensions paid out under the present system. This
means that individuals featuring a relatively high wage towards the end of their career
(and who would therefore be entitled to a relatively high pension under the current
system) but who nevertheless end up with a negative IA balance will tend to lose from
the reform, since they are entitled to only a relatively low minimum pension.
In the broad version of the proposed accounts, Fölster (1999) also includes pen-
sions, health-care spending, and university tuition in the accounts. Lifetime income
insurance is provided by computing a minimum guaranteed pension based on the
current rules for computing contributory pensions. The guaranteed pension thus rises
with the contributions into the accounts. If this pension exceeds the annuity that can
be ﬁnanced from the resources in the savings account at age 65, the lifetime income
insurance pays up the difference. In addition, if the account balance becomesnegative
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additional withdrawals and the individual does not have to further run up the debt in
his account. The insurance payments are ﬁnanced through an explicit insurance pre-
mium on labor income. As a consequence, marginal tax rates on labor income remain
positive for individuals who do not expect to beneﬁt from the income guarantee. In
applying the system to Sweden, Fölster (1999) computes an insurance premium that
amounts to about 20% of all payments ﬂowing into the accounts. In addition, the
system includes redistribution from men to women because the conversion factor for
computing the annuity is the same for both sexes (even though women tend to live
longer than men do). Also, parents beneﬁt from a higher conversion factor at retire-
ment, a policy that helps people with children.
Orszag and Snower (2002) focus on unemployment accounts. Workers would be
required to put mandatory contributions in their unemployment account to ﬁnance
withdrawals when unemployed. Individuals with a zero balance would remain en-
titled to regular unemployment assistance. In addition, the contributions of workers
earning low incomes could be subsidized. These subsidies and the unemployment
assistance beneﬁts paid to the unemployed with zero balances would be ﬁnanced by
taxes on the contributions of other workers. In this way, marginal taxes on labor in-
come remain positive for all workers. Orszag and Snower (1997) extend this proposal
to human capital accounts covering education and training and health accounts apply-
ing to sickness, disability and health insurance. The government could redistribute re-
sources across people’s accounts in a balanced budget manner: contributions of low-
income groups could be subsidized, while contributions of high-income groups could
be taxed. The taxes could be used also to ﬁnance the withdrawals of those whose ac-
count balances fall below a certain minimum. Moreover, to ﬁght cream skimming
and selection, the pricing of insurance would have to be regulated.
Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explore social-insurance accounts that are integrated with
theretirementsystem.Whereastheaccountsraiseexpectedutilityexante,theydonot
guarantee that all agents are better off ex post. In particular, agents who have suffered
frequent and lengthy spells of unemployment during their lives may end up with
lower retirement beneﬁts than with unemployment beneﬁts that are entirely ﬁnanced
through taxes. Within this setting, Stiglitz and Yun (2002) explore which share of
unemployment beneﬁts should be optimally ﬁnanced from savings accounts from the
point of view of maximizing ex-ante utility of the workers. They argue that explicit
transfers from high-skilled to low-skilled workers could mimic the transfers between
these groups implicit in the current unemployment insurances without undoing the
efﬁciency gains from individual accounts in combating moral hazard.
Stiglitz and Yun (2002) argue also in favor of an integrated lifetime insurance
program under which people can borrow against their compulsory pension savings
to provide cover for not only unemployment but also other risks, including adverse
health and disability shocks. They argue that all social insurances should be inte-
grated unless risks are perfectly correlated with each other. The smaller the correla-
tion between the various shocks, the larger become the beneﬁts from integrating the
various insurances. In such an integrated program, the optimal amount of self insur-
ance would depend on shocks experienced earlier in life. An individual who has not
experienced many adverse shocks early in life can self-insure more risks later in life.
However, in order to provide lifetime income insurance, the government has to bail82 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
out individuals who have already experienced various serious adverse shocks when
they enter retirement. These individuals cannot self-insure, however, as the cumula-
tion of the various adverse shocks would force their living standards below a socially
acceptable level.
Leijnse et al. (2004) propose a three-pillar system. The ﬁrst pillar is tax-ﬁnanced
and includes transfer programs that tend to involve signiﬁcant lifetime redistribution
and only limited moral hazard. The third pillar includes voluntary saving schemes.
The second pillar, which may include income-related beneﬁts for individuals experi-
encing unemployment or sickness or taking parental leave, involves mandatory con-
tributions to individual accounts that offer neither a lifetime income guarantee nor
liquidity insurance. As a direct consequence, some individuals who make frequent
withdrawals and exhaust their accounts would lose ex post. The second pillar, how-
ever, would be a mixture between insurance and saving. Hence, on a sectoral level,
social partners can force workers to use part of their contributions to buy insurance.
In that case, potential ex post losses for those who make frequent withdrawals would
be contained, as would be the potential welfare gains from reduced moral hazard.
Indeed, the optimal mix between saving and insurance would depend on the scope
for moral hazard. In particular, the share of saving and self-insurance would increase
if individuals bear a greater personal responsibility for an event.
Bovenberg et al. (2006) evaluate a proposal of the Danish Economic Council
(2005, Chap. VI). Each citizen in the age group from 18 years until the ofﬁcial retire-
ment age of 65 years would be required to deposit a certain percentage of his labor in-
come in an individual account every year. Whenever a person receives certain social-
insurance beneﬁts according to the current eligibility rules (which are assumed to be
unchanged), his individual account would be debited by the corresponding amount,
and the balance on the IA would be carried forward with the after-tax interest rate on
short-term government bonds. If the IA balance is positive at the time of retirement,
the balance is converted into an annuity that is added to the ordinary public retirement
pension. If the IA balance is negative when the individual reaches the retirement age,
the account is simply set to zero. The following programs, which involve a rela-
tively low degree of interpersonal redistribution, are included in the accounts: early
retirement beneﬁts, grants to students in higher education, short-term unemployment
beneﬁts, short-term sickness beneﬁts, child beneﬁts, and parental leave beneﬁts.
The system features a lifetime-income guarantee ensuring that no person can be
worse off in any realized contingency than under the existing tax-transfer system,
while individuals with positive account balances are better off. This outcome follows
from two features of the proposal. First, for each individual taxpayer the mandatory
contribution to the IA is matched by a corresponding tax cut. Second, every taxpayer
can take up beneﬁts under the current eligibility rules regardless of the (negative or
positive) balance on his IA, and no taxpayer can end up with a lower retirement pen-
sion than under the present system. However, the positive IA balances that are added
to the public pension obviously harm the government budget. Bovenberg et al. (2006)
show that this so-called static revenue loss—i.e. the change in net public revenue that
wouldoccurifbehaviorwereunchanged—increaseswiththeamountofinterpersonal
lifetime redistribution implied by the programs that are included in the account sys-
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the introduction of individual accounts. As an offset to the static revenue loss, there
are dynamic revenue gains reﬂecting the budgetary impact of behavioral changes.
These revenue gains can be viewed as the efﬁciency gains from the reform, arising
partly from the positive incentive effect of a closer actuarial link between contribu-
tions and beneﬁts, and partly from reduced moral hazard as individuals effectively
ﬁnance more of their own social beneﬁts.
Using rather conservative assumptions for labor-supply elasticities and data for
the actual Danish income distribution, Bovenberg et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the dynamic
revenue gains dominate the static revenue losses for small individual accounts. The
dynamic revenue gains are driven mainly by the impact of a lower effective beneﬁt
rate on the incentives to take up public beneﬁts. The overall revenue gain implies that
the introduction of individual accounts is Pareto improving. Neither the government
nor individuals are worse off after the reform. Whereas individuals are more uncer-
tain about the level of their retirement beneﬁt, they cannot be worse off in any con-
tingency. Their ex-ante welfare level, which accounts for the additional risk from the
introduction of the IAs, thus cannot fall. The key explanation for the Pareto improve-
ment is that the programs included in the accounts have a much smaller impact on the
distribution of lifetime income than on the annual income distribution. This reduces
the static revenue losses from individual accounts protecting the lifetime poor com-
pared to policies that protect individuals from suffering income losses in each year.
Individual accounts, which provide information on who is lifetime poor, thus help to
substantially reduce the efﬁciency losses from redistributing lifetime incomes.
Future research will have to show whether similar results can be derived for other
countries and other programs. The conditions for introducing individual accounts in
the universal welfare states of the Scandinavian countries seem to be particularly
attractive. First of all, the distribution of lifetime incomes is relatively equal, while
a broad coverage of social transfer programs implies that taxpayers end up receiving
substantial public transfers over their life course. Second, marginal tax and beneﬁt
rates are high so that the efﬁciency and budgetary gains from improved incentives
are substantial. Whereas the ﬁrst factor contains the static revenue losses, the second
factor boosts the dynamic revenue gains.
The proposed savings schemes described above are all mandatory, with the poten-
tial disadvantage that they may force some people to save too much. As an alternative
or supplement to mandatory schemes, the government may wish to promote volun-
tary saving schemes—say, through tax incentives. An example of a voluntary saving
scheme is the so-called life-course scheme introduced in the Netherlands. The funds
in this scheme can currently be used only for ﬁnancing leave. In the future, however,
the government may allow the owners of these accounts to utilize the funds for ﬁ-
nancing deductibles in social insurance. These voluntary schemes seem particularly
suited for high- and middle-income earners who are not likely to beneﬁt from the
income guarantees provided by social assistance. For others, means-tested social as-
sistance erodes precautionary saving motives. For these groups, the government thus
cannot rely on voluntary saving schemes, unless the government provides substantial
tax incentives and appropriate defaults encouraging people to save.84 A.L. Bovenberg et al.
5 Concluding remarks
Our analysis suggests that individual accounts can play a useful role in ﬁnancing so-
cial beneﬁts that have only little redistributive power in a life-cycle perspective and
give rise to serious moral hazard. For such beneﬁts, savings accounts can enhance
labor-market incentives at a relatively low cost in terms of a more unequal distribu-
tion of lifetime incomes. This is especially so if savings accounts are accompanied
by labor-market institutions that combat long-term employment and facilitate rapid
turnover and by social policies that provide a lifetime income guarantee and ensure
an equal distribution of human capital. As the changing nature of social risks makes
social insurance more expensive in terms of distorted labor-market incentives, indi-
vidual accounts with a lifetime income guarantee seem to be an attractive alternative
to simple cuts in taxes and beneﬁts. Indeed, such accounts can continue to provide
substantial income security at a time when a dynamic world economy confronts many
people with substantial risks. In this way, individual accounts can help protect the so-
cial legitimacy of a competitive market system that stimulates innovation and growth
but also gives rise to substantial risks associated with creative destruction.
For each type of human capital risk, another combination between insurance
and self-insurance through saving is optimal, depending on the magnitude of the
risk in terms of the potential drop in lifetime income and the potential danger of
moral hazard because of endogeneity and non-veriﬁability of the insured risk. Self-
insurance should be relatively important for non-catastrophic risks that people can
affect through non-veriﬁable actions, such as short-term unemployment and the ﬁrst
sickness days.
Apart from the changing nature of social risks and the continued demand for in-
come security, several factors havemade individualaccountsin social insurance more
attractive. First of all, modern information and communication technologies enable
governments to keep systematic records of the contribution and withdrawal histories
of their citizens. Second, more efﬁcient capital markets allow individuals to smooth
their consumption over their life courses. By thus allowing individuals to decouple
annual consumption from annual disposable incomes, better functioning capital mar-
kets make lifetime rather than annual incomes better indicators of overall welfare.
Moreover, ﬁnancial innovation allows private ﬁnancial institutions to administer the
compulsory savings accounts. A further reason for the increased attractiveness of
individual accounts is that they are fully portable between jobs. Hence, social insur-
ance does not tie workers to their initial employer. This facilitates labor mobility and
the ﬂexibility of the labor market. It is also consistent with the emancipation of the
worker, who becomes more independent of speciﬁc employers.
Individual accounts may have political-economy implications. In particular, by
separating lifetime redistribution from consumption-smoothing and insurance, indi-
vidual accounts increase the transparency of lifetime redistribution. This may weaken
the political support for this redistribution. Another factor that may work in the same
direction is that the middle class no longer beneﬁts from redistribution, which is now
more closely targeted at the lifetime poor (see, e.g., Cassamatta et al. 2000). At the
same time, however, individual accounts give individuals a stronger sense of owner-
ship and personal responsibility. This may strengthen popular support for the welfareIndividual savings accounts for social insurance 85
state and the liquidity and lifetime insurance it provides. Stronger personal ownership
may also make it more difﬁcult for the government to change beneﬁt rules, thereby
reducing political risks.
The lifetime income guarantee implies also that, while marginal rates are cut for
others, marginal tax rates tend to remain high for the lifetime poor. The employ-
ment gap between low-skilled and high-skilled workers may thus increase unless the
government focuses active labor-market policies on the bottom of the labor market
and employs instruments other than ﬁnancial incentives to activate the lifetime poor.
A related drawback may be that, although the lifetime poor may not become worse
off in absolute terms, they may become poorer compared to the lifetime rich. This is a
serious drawback if people care more about relative incomes than absolute incomes.
Indeed, in the presence of such standard-of-living utilities, optimal marginal tax rates
at the top of the income distribution would be positive.
Mandatory individual savings accounts can be a useful component of an overall
social policy package. In addition to equal opportunities at the start of life through
an equal distribution of human capital, such a policy package should provide some
form of lifetime income guarantee. By using information on lifetime incomes, redis-
tribution implicit in such an income guarantee can occur at lower efﬁciency costs.
Moreover, actuarially fair links between contributions and expected beneﬁts allevi-
ate the labor-market distortions associated with social insurance for middle- and high
incomes. Finally, by facilitating consumption smoothing through savings schemes
offering liquidity insurance, the government increases the scope for self-insurance,
thereby combating moral hazard in social insurance. Through all these channels, sav-
ings accounts support social policy by reducing the costs that are associated with an
effective mix of redistribution, social insurance and consumption smoothing.
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